

MTS-SMA Operations Protocol for DTT

Information

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1 Purpose

The purpose of this Operations Protocol for DTT (this document) is to record the arrangements agreed between Sydney Metro Authority (SMA) and Metro Train Sydney (MTS) for Dynamic Train Testing (DTT).

This document:

- Defines the Rail Transport Operator (RTO), Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) and Rolling Stock Operator (RSO) roles and interfacing activities to be performed for the Southwest Metro (SWM) project by accredited parties, MTS and SMA.
- Sets out the requirements, roles and obligations of the accredited parties as well as each entity involved in DTT for SWM, including MTR Corporation (Sydney) Sydenham 2 Bankstown (S2B) (John Holland and Laing O'Rourke Joint Venture) and appointed sub-contractors of these parties.
- Supports the Rail Safety Interface Agreements (RSIAs) between accredited parties, which are the primary documents that record the arrangements for implementing and maintaining measures to manage risks associated with DTT.
- Covers the SWM portion of the project and establishes the framework and procedures for SWM, to ensure that employees and interface contractors or subcontractors of MTS and SMA (including subcontractors) are aware of their roles, responsibilities and accountabilities during SWM DTT.
- Provides the guidance for the responsibilities of each entity involved in DTT for SWM, and
- Sets out the shared responsibilities and accountabilities of the parties for rail safety in accordance with Section 50 of the Rail Safety National Law 2012 (RSNL).

1.1 Scope

This document applies to:

- Interfacing activities
- Systems of Safeworking for train movements
- Communications protocols and information transfer
- Infrastructure Booking Authority and management, and
- Effective management of the rail corridor and the interface with stations during DTT only
- Incident and Emergency Management during DTT only

Key elements addressed within this document include:

- Rolling stock movements and transfers to enable DTT.
- Rolling stock movements from infrastructure managed by one RIM to infrastructure managed by another RIM, which will be in accordance with requirements defined in TTZ and Train Transfer Procedure.
- Rolling stock will be managed between MTR and MTS through the "MTR/MTS Trains T&C Handover Protocol" (SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-TD-PLN-010158).

This document covers all T&C stages from and including Stage 3. For completeness, the following activities are excluded:

- SWM passenger rail operations.
- Interactions with Sydney Trains. Any interaction which may be required with Sydney Trains is managed in accordance with the Triparty RSIA for the DTT phase. For the end state operational phase (post-handover) MTS/ST Operations Interface Protocol (OIP) maintained by MTS and Sydney Trains will be used. Additionally,

Sydney Trains will be consulted through the RSIA process and communications from MTR via townhall communication sessions and other established interface and possession meetings.

- Trial running.
- Any possessions required on the Operational M1 section (City & Northwest), which are managed by MTS and are subject to SMA approval, and
- SMA/ARTC RSIA agreement managed by SMA during DTT.

1.2 Overview of Dynamic Train Testing

DTT is broken into five significant stages as nominated below;

- Stage 1: Low-speed DTT in Restricted Manual mode
- Stage 2: Low-speed DTT in Protected Manual and UTO modes
- Stage 3: High-Speed DTT in Protected Manual and UTO modes (Stage 3.5 - including ATC Bypass)
- Stage 4: High-Speed multi train testing
- Stage 5: System Cutover

The diagram below outlines the SWM DTT Stages.




Figure 1 - Dynamic Test Stages Test Stages

Further information relating to the DTT stages is contained within the Testing and Commissioning Plan for Dynamic Train Running for Southwest (SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-PM-PLN-082642).

For each of the significant stages a hazard log and safety assurance statement will be provided and subject to joint safety assurance governance arrangements between SMA and MTS, prior to commencement of each stage of testing.

For Stages 1 and 2; following MTS Tier 1 CCB approval, Sydney Metro, as RIM, will convene a review board including representatives from MTS's Tier 1 CCB to review and accept readiness for commencement of the DTT stage. For Stages 3 and beyond MTS Tier 1 will be the final Assurance gate and review Sydney Metro NAC Assurance and Infrastructure Certification. The governance arrangements for DTT are defined in section 8 of this document.

1.3 Objectives

The objective of this document is to explain the RTO, RIM and RSO framework, Network Rule set and procedures for DTT phase using the Metropolis Train on the SWM including:

- Transfer of MTS Electrical Multiple Units (EMU's) between MTS Network and SWM.
- Conducting train testing within SWM utilising MTS EMU's and MTS Train Operator (CJC-T).
- Conducting train testing between MTS Network and SWM.
- Induction, training and competence parameters for the SWM.
- Management of re-certification of infrastructure between tests.

- Management of Defects for the purpose of conducting DTT
- Management of the Electrical infrastructure.
- Systems of Safeworking for train movements and Rail Safety Worker (RSW) compliance under SMA RIM.
- Communications protocols and information transfer
- Scheduling, control and monitoring of railway operations for DTT
- Management of Incident and Emergencies during DTT activities

1.4 Accredited Parties

The accredited parties for the DTT are as follows:

- Sydney Metro is the RIM for rail infrastructure within the Local Possession Authority (LPA) during dynamic train testing.
- SMA is the RIM for the Track & Transit Space, Fenceline incl. Security, Civils incl. Geotech and OHW incl. Power as outlined in Figure 2 below.
- Metro Trains Sydney (MTS) is the RIM for the Systems (TSOM Works)
- MTS is accountable for scheduling, control and monitoring of railway operations for DTT
- MTS is accountable for Train, Signalling System, Communications & Control System for DTT activities
- MTS is accountable for Emergency Management during DTT
- MTS is the RSO for rolling stock used for DTT and therefore has RTO safety duties and RSO safety duties relating to the subject rolling stock.
- When a TTZ is not in place, existing RIM arrangements apply. Assurance that Rail Infrastructure and systems are fit to use for DTT activities will be undertaken through the IBA process.
- SMA must provide assurance of compliance with its safety duties.
- MTS must provide assurance of compliance with its safety duties.

Further roles of parties include:

- SMA is the RIM for the HV network. SMA has engaged SCLW to be the interim operator and maintainer of the HV network. MTS is the DNSP.
- S2B & Martinus Rail will be the Principal Contractors for the SWM Project for the purpose of the WHS Act. and will operate under the direction and oversight of SMA
- During DTT, SMA will establish a Local Possession Authority (SMLPA) using SMA Network Rules and Procedures.
- In consultation with SMA Possession Protection Officer (PPO), a Train Testing Zone (TTZ) will be established by parties defined within the TTZ Procedure, inside the SMLPA.
- Within the TTZ, MTS Rail Safety Rules & Procedures apply for all rolling stock movements.
- For completeness, MTS is the RIM for NW and City rail infrastructure.
- When a TTZ is not in place, SMA has appointed RSO's for Construction on SWM to Laing O'Rourke, UGL, Taylor Rail and Martinus.

Key Accreditation and Infrastructure Assurance Principles




Figure 2 – Accreditation Principles

1.5 RIM Handover Protocol – Sydney Metro and MTS

In the event of a Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) handover between Sydney Metro and Metro Trains Sydney (MTS), the transition will be governed by a structured and jointly endorsed process to ensure the safe, compliant, and seamless transfer of responsibilities. This will include early engagement with ONRSR and other relevant stakeholders, development of a transfer form detailing scope, timelines, and roles, and the transfer of rail infrastructure registers, including as required maintenance records, testing records, defects and operational constraints. Both parties will conduct joint risk assessments and validate safety procedures, interface agreements, and operational readiness for subsequent operations. The incoming RTO will demonstrate capability through documented procedures, trained personnel, and integration of the related assets. Final endorsement of the handover will be obtained from both organisations, with a post-handover review scheduled to monitor any residual risks.

2 Incident and Emergency Management Principles

During DTT activities within Southwest and M1 Network, a single point of safety accountability will be established to ensure effective command, control, and coordination of any major incident or emergency. MTS and SMA has agreed that the MTS Manager Network Control will assume the role of the Dynamic Train Testing Commander responsibilities. The DTT Commander provides operational leadership during any major or safety-critical incident that occurs within the scope of Dynamic Train Testing. This includes managing a wide range of scenarios such as derailments, unauthorised intrusions, signal or system outages, fire or smoke events, personnel injury, or environmental hazards. Per the MTS Emergency Management Plan any Level 2 or 3 Incident or Cat A Notifiable Occurrence will initiate a DTT Commander response. (Noting that the MNC assumes the role of the DTT Commander).

The following principles apply for the management of major incidents and emergencies during DTT activities:

- SMA & MTS have assigned the Dynamic Train Testing Commander role to the Manager Network Control (MNC) as the single point of Command and Control for all Incidents and Emergencies that occur during Dynamic Train Testing activities.
- The DTT Commander will coordinate the incident response by directing operational and safety-critical resources under their control, which may include:
 - Train Coordinator(s)
 - Protection Officer(s)
 - Rail Safety personnel
 - Engineering or Testing staff as required
 - Emergency Services
- The DTT Commander will liaise directly with Emergency Services, facilitating safe access to the SW rail corridor and providing briefings on site hazards, access constraints, and safety controls.
- Where traction power isolation is required, the DTT Commander will instruct the SCLW Electrical Controller to safely de-energise power to support emergency response or site access for SW and MTS Engineering Controller for M1 Network.
- The DTT Commander is responsible for site preservation and must promptly notify both the MTS and SMA Rail Safety Managers (or their nominated delegates) to initiate appropriate regulatory reporting and liaison with relevant authorities (e.g. ONRSR).
- The DTT Commander must ensure accurate and timely communication of incident details to all relevant stakeholders, as outlined in the TTZ Communications protocol
- DTT Commander for SW Network will direct and liaise with Emergency Services including providing access to the rail corridor
- DTT Commander will preserve the site and notify both MTS & SMA Rail Safety Manager or nominated person within each agency to liaise with relevant regulatory authorities

Further information relating to the management of Incident and Emergency will be detailed in the MTS Emergency Management Plan, MTR Incident Management Plan and the S2B Incident Emergency and Crisis Management Plan.

3 Responsibilities

For the purposes of this document, MTS and SMA are the accredited parties responsible for the scope of work assigned. These parties delegate specific tasks within the scope to other parties, as detailed in the table below. The table further outlines the respective responsibilities associated with each task. The accredited parties hold the statutory safety duties. Assurance is provided by parties delegated specific tasks that is relied on by the accredited party to ensure compliance with the statutory safety duties.

Table 1 – SWM DTT High-Level Responsibilities

Accredited Party	Responsibilities
SMA-RIM	Control of traction power
SMA-RIM	Possession safe working and security
SMA-RIM	Rail Infrastructure safe for DTT testing

SMA-RIM	Station interface management
SMA-RIM	SWM PEB/MGF infrastructure
SMA-RIM	SWM rail corridor infrastructure
SMA-RIM	Management of implementation SMLPA as per SMA Network Rules and Procedures, including completion of IBA Checklist.
SMA-RIM	Induction training, and communication of works to all parties daily.
SMA-RIM	Interim operator of SWM HV & 1500V electrical network, under MTS Electrical Safety Rules
SMA-RIM	Maintenance management of the HV traction substations and HV network on the SWM. Authorises and undertakes any outages.
SMA-RIM	Management of Protection Officers in the SWM section and the boundaries for which they work. Responsible for implementing the SMA Network Rules & Procedures for the S2B T&C team.
SMA-RIM	Management of the four week lookahead to the various works that need to be managed in the SWM Section.
SMA-RIM	Review and approve the Infrastructure Booking Authority Form for the purpose of commencing DTT.
MTS-RIM	Effective control of Train Movements by Train Coordinator and/or Traffic Controller
MTS-RSO	Safe scheduling of Metropolis Trains on SWM network
MTS-RIM	
MTS-RIM	Review and endorse the Infrastructure Booking Authority Form for the purpose of commencing DTT. (TSOM Assets and Dual RIM purposes)
MTS-RIM	TSOM Systems (Train, Signalling System, Comms & Control System) safe for DTT activities
MTS-RIM	For TOCC - TSOM Systems in the TOCC including Automatic Train System panel
MTS-RSO	Supply of the rolling stock Safety Certification
MTS-RSO	Maintenance of rolling stock being used during testing and advise when the rolling stock will need to be transferred back to SMTF-N for maintenance.
MTS-RSO	Ensure integrity of Rollingstock, subsystems and baseline configuration during DTT.

SMA-RIM MTS-RIM/RSO	Review, endorsement (MTS) and approval (SMA) of Safe Notices detailing the work undertaken, safe working limits and any other arrangements required in accordance with the TTZ procedure.
SMA-RIM MTS-RIM/RSO	Incident Reporting in accordance with RIM / RSO requirements
SMA-RIM MTS-RIM/RSO	Competency Management of rail safety workers
MTS-RIM/RSO	Managing major incidents and emergencies in accordance with the TTZ procedure during DTT activities

4 SMNW & City / SW Metro Boundary Definitions

4.1 Geographic Boundary Definition

- MTS RIM area boundary is from the hard barrier fence at 5.440km (approx.) Up & Down MSW (Sydenham) to end of terminal line at SMTF-North.
- SMA RIM area boundary is from the hard Barrier fence at 5.440km (approx.) Up & Down MSW to end of terminal line at Bankstown 18.632km (Buffer Stops).
- Signalling, communications and traction asset boundaries will be agreed between SMA and MTS as RIM's to meet RIM obligations and support DTT testing.

4.1.1 Proposed RIM Boundary Protection Arrangements

The proposed protection arrangement for the RIM boundary includes:

- Stop Blocks, STOP boards and a red light will be installed:
 - At MTS Network Limits 5.410km (approx.) DOWN & UP Tracks with signage stating “DO NOT PASS without authority from S2B Possession Protection Officer (PPO)” including relevant Contact details
 - At SMA LPA Limits 5.535km (approx.) on UP & DOWN with signage stating “DO NOT PASS without authority from MTS OCC TC” including relevant Contact details
- A hard barrier (i.e. Fence) is in place between the reconfigured stop block and double-facing stop boards to define the RIM boundary and stop unauthorised access between the two Networks.




Figure 3 - Proposed RIM Boundary Protection Arrangements

4.2 OHW Control Area Boundary Definition

The OHW Control Area Boundary is provided within the Sydney Metro City & Southwest Electrical Interface Plan and within the Sydney Metro City & South West OHW Sectioning Diagram. Information contained below is to provide a status with proposed Configuration, therefore not for operational purposes.

Doc Ref: *SMCSWLWC-SYC-CSW-ED-PLN-023348 - Sydney Metro City & Southwest Electrical Interface Plan* and *NSRLOTS-NRT-OH-DRG-542211 Sydney Metro City & South West OHW Sectioning Diagram*.

The demarcation of electrical control is as follows:

- Switches CSW12/1B&1C and CSW11/1B&1C will locally be set at an open position until the readiness of City and SW integration or during testing of the switches.

- MTS will control and operate OHW Sections CSW11/1B and CSW12/1B to the city side of the overlap at SW5+486.
- SCLW will control and operate OHW Sections CSW11/1C and CSW12/1C from the country end of the overlap at SW5+450.
- Access to the overlap between SW5+450 and SW5+486 will be managed by SCLW with approval from MTS.

4.2.1 OHW Control

The OHW system will be under the control of Sydney Metro's contractor SCLW as interim Operator and Maintainer of the Sydney Metro Southwest portion of the MTS HV network. The OHW system will be managed by SCLW in accordance with the MTS Electrical Safety Rules. tCBTC Control Area Boundary Definition

CBTC control area boundaries for DTT are defined within the SMCSW – Southwest T&C migration plan (ref. SMCSWTSM-ALS-CSW-TC-PLN-102546).

MTS CBTC Area of Control is as per the MTS CBTC Scheme Plan ((BNK-SYD) SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-SE-DWG-001357.50.WAE.50.01).

Responsibilities for train control are as follows:

- The MTS Traffic Controller (TC) is responsible for the movement of trains on the MTS network (City and Northwest) in accordance with the MTS Rules and Procedures.
- When a TTZ is established for Southwest dynamic testing, the Train Coordinator is responsible for authorising the movement of trains within the TTZ area in accordance with the TTZ procedure.
- For Southwest Network, route setting and train movements must be controlled by the Traffic Controller and/or ATS Engineer under the authority of the Train Coordinator.
- For M1 Network , route setting and train movements must be controlled by the Traffic Controller under the authority of the Manager Network Control.

4.3 Working Within 500 Metres of SMLPA Limits

Any DTT within 500m of the Stop Blocks installed at the Sydney Metro SMLPA Limits must be risk assessed and approved by SMA & MTS. A Safe Notice must be issued to permit working within 500m of the SMLPA Limits (Stop Blocks). Further clarification and process are documented in the Train Testing Zone (TTZ) procedure and within S2B Possession Management Plan.

5 Train Operations

The scope of train operations includes:

- Metropolis train movements to access the SWM from the MTS network.
- Metropolis trains movements to access the MTS network from the SWM.
- Metropolis trains undertaking testing and commissioning activities within the SWM.
- Battery Electric Locomotives (BEL) undertaking testing and commissioning activities within the SWM and/or for recovery purposes.
- Appropriate Risk assessments have been completed by MTR (Integrator) in conjunction with MTS/SMA/S2B and the controls have been implemented as per DTT hazard log.
- Trains stabling within the SWM and SMTF.

The scope of this document does not include Engineering Vehicle Movements which are managed through SMA and/or MTS's existing possession management processes.

The handover of trains between MTR and MTS is via the MTR/MTS Trains T&C Handover Protocol (SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-TD-PLN-010158).

5.1 Train Stabling within the Southwest Metro

Metropolis trains are expected to be stabled within the SWM area, details will be captured in the S2B Corridor Security Plan and approved by MTS (RSO) and SMA (RIM). The responsibility for the coordination and the protocols related to stabling will be undertaken by MTR and agreed with S2B as per the S2B Corridor Security Management Plan. Ref: *Sydenham to Bankstown - SWM3 Security Management Plan*.

5.2 Test Trains within MTS M1 Network

The operational protocols for test trains operating within the MTS Network will be governed by the Train Testing Zone (TTZ) Procedure. While MTS holds responsibility as the Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) for the M1 network, it is permissible, under certain conditions, to extend the TTZ into the MTS Network to facilitate safe and effective train movements where required. Prior to implementing this arrangement, MTS and SMA must collaborate to agree on the operational and protection requirements, ensuring that all safety and operational protocols are met. The process for extending the TTZ into MTS Network will be fully covered within the TTZ Procedure and notified via a Safe Notice.

6 Electrical Interface

6.1 SMNW and City Electrical Operations

The MTS Electrical Network for SMNW and City is operated by MTS in accordance with the MTS Safety Management System, in particular Element 32: Management to the Electrical Distribution Network, the MTS Electrical Safety Rules and supporting electrical procedures.

6.2 Southwest Electrical Operations

SCLW Electrical Controllers shall operate the Southwest portion of the MTS Electrical Network in accordance with the MTS Electrical Safety Rules and supporting electrical procedures to manage for normal, abnormal and emergency scenarios, and also perform switching as required for CSW project teams to perform works. SCLW responsibility is to manage the HV and 1500V DC during the DTT phase of the SWM section. Any permits required for outstanding construction works must be approved by Sydney Metro and managed by SCLW.

SCLW is to perform switching as per agreed Electrical Interface Plan (SMCSWLWC-SYC-CSW-ED-PLN-023348).

6.3 Electrical Competency under the Electrical Safety Rules

Electrical Competency under the MTS Electrical Safety Rules is required by all workers in the rail corridor and all stakeholders must ensure its employees, core-contractors and subcontractors have obtained necessary certifications under Electrical Safety Rules to perform the tasks.

All potential roles and associated competency requirements are described in the MTS Electrical Authorisations [NWRLOTS-NRT-SWD-HV-SPC-720350]

7 Communications

7.1 Communications Protocol

Communication protocols between SMA and relevant parties involved in DTT (MTS, MTR, Alstom, S2B and SCLW) must provide clear communication and understanding during the movement of trains from the MTS Network into the Southwest Network and during DTT. Communications protocols will be documented in the TTZ & Train Transfer Procedures. These procedures will determine the roles, responsibilities and safety critical communications between all affected Rail Safety Workers involved in DTT.

Documentation concerning DTT activities, including Safe Notice, Safety Alerts, and others, will be distributed to relevant workers through SMA and MTS via their existing communication channels. This may include Possession Briefings, emails, relevant internal and external sites, RIW Platform, etc. It is the responsibility of each RIM/RSO to ensure that workers have been provided with the relevant information to carry out DTT duties.

7.2 Town Hall Sessions

To support transparent communication and promote operational readiness, Town Hall Sessions will be conducted as part of the Dynamic Train Testing (DTT) communication strategy. These sessions are designed to brief all relevant stakeholders including operational staff, safety representatives, project teams, and contractors on the planned DTT activities, safety protocols, infrastructure configurations, and key roles and responsibilities. Town Hall Sessions will be delivered via Microsoft Teams to enable broad participation across geographic locations.

7.3 Safe Notice

For the purposes of Dynamic Train Testing (DTT), a Safe Notice will be issued by MTS and endorsed by SMA to formally advise all relevant DTT workers of upcoming testing activities, including any temporary variations or exceptions to the approved Train Testing Zone (TTZ) and Train Transfer Procedure. Unlike standard Safe Notices issued under MTS Rail Safety Rule MTR 428 – Safe Notices, which are limited to advertising deviations from approved MTS Rail Safety Rules, this DTT specific Safe Notice serves as an agreed mechanism to manage the unique operational and safety arrangements associated with DTT activities. It provides a coordinated communication method to ensure all workers are aware of operational expectations, safety protocols, and any procedural adjustments during the testing period.

8 Configuration Change and Network Assurance

8.1 Configuration Change Management

The MTS Configuration Management Plan (CMP) (MTS-AGN-PL-70114) outlines the roles and responsibilities of the O&M Contractor (MTS) as RSO and RIM for TSOM Assets to assess and approve relevant activities for DTT.

The SMA Network Assurance Procedure (NAP) (SM-17-00003119) which details the Sydney Metro Network Assurance Committee (NAC) activities. The rail infrastructure relevant for DTT will be reviewed and accepted by the committee based on NAC Gate 4 submissions provided by Technically Assured Organisations (TAOs) endorsed by the project.

Each party will review and approve the assets under their accreditation and MTS CCBs will review SMA NAC and sub-NAC assurance including review and acceptance of all relevant Rail Infrastructure Certification. If required Conditions will be raised preventing DTT Commencement until MTS and Sydney Metro accepts the rail infrastructure is safe SFAIRP for dynamic testing.

Final approval to commence SW DTT will be presented to a MTS Tier 1 CCB, reviewing and accepting outcomes from SMA NAC, OTS2 and MTS Tier 2 CCB as illustrated in Figure 3 below. This approval will be fed back to SMA Integrated NAC ensuring SMA reviews and accepts decisions by MTS's CCB process.

The consultation and agreement of risks and controls for all Sydney Trains interfaces associated with DTT will be approved by the Joint Configuration Control Board (JCCB).

The consultation and agreement of risks and controls for ARTC will be agreed and documented. For Low Speed DTT ARTC has elected not to conduct a CCB given the limited impact of DTT activities to the shared interface.




Figure 4 – Configuration change and governance arrangements

8.1.1 Temporary Operations Control Centre (TOCC)

Under Stage 2 Low Speed Dynamic Testing SMA is RIM, under a temporary Variation of Accreditation, for the TSOM system including signalling and the ATS panel in the TOCC. Prior to Commencement of Stage 3 High Speed Dynamic Testing SMA will, using the Sydney Metro RIM Transfer form, transfer RIM from SM to MTS for the TSOM Systems including the Signalling System and ATS Panel in the TOCC. In addition, as part of the MTS CCB process for Stage 3 High Speed, MTS will review assurance from Alstom that the Signalling System, which includes the ATS panel in the TOCC, has been validated through Low Speed Testing and is safe to conduct High Speed Testing.

8.2 Care & Maintenance

Care and maintenance of all rail infrastructure assets on the Southwest Corridor will be performed by appointed contractors under RIM accreditation.

8.3 Defect Management

A defect identification and rectification process has been established for the parties (SMA, MTS, and the relevant contractors) to agree on the methodology and timing for identifying defects through site inspections, surveillance, and maintenance activities. Defect identification may be conducted as a joint exercise by the parties. All identified defects shall be recorded in a consolidated register and subject to the agreed rectification and review process.

Joint workshops and working groups shall be organised with relevant stakeholders, including MTS, to categorise defects based on their criticality and to monitor their resolution. Each defect shall be assigned an owner responsible for rectifying it within the agreed timeframe and providing the relevant assurance artefacts required to close the defect in the register following acceptance by the parties.

Refer to the City & Southwest – Engineering, Design and Assurance Management Plan (SM-19-00147306), which details the process, including consultation with MTS, followed at various stages of the Testing and Commissioning phases and asset handover for assets delivered by SMA as the accredited party.

9 RSW Competence

9.1 Competency Requirements

RIM and RSO competency requirements for all workers involved in DTT are defined within the MTR Testing and Commissioning Competency Matrix , Train Testing Zone Procedure and the MTS Electrical Safety Rules and Procedures.

It is the responsibility of the respective parties to ensure rail safety workers assigned to DTT are trained and competent to do so in line with the RTO competence requirements.

As the RIM, SMA is responsible for ensuring all personnel undertaking work associated with rail infrastructure during DTT hold the necessary competencies to perform their roles.

As the RSO and RIM, MTS is responsible for ensuring all personnel involved in DTT hold the necessary competencies to perform their roles.

9.2 Rail Safety Workers (RSW)

As Rail Safety Workers (RSW), testing and operational personnel involved in DTT will hold the following competencies:

- Applicable task related competencies for undertaking all rail safety work required of their role.
- TfNSW Operator Job Role
- S2B – Sydenham to Bankstown Job Role .
- MTS Operator Job Role
- All RSW's must also have current medical fitness at the required medical category.
- Rail Industry Worker (RIW) card with the required competencies, job roles and medical category as noted within the Competency Matrix in the Train Testing Zone Procedure.

In addition, as per MTS requirements when conducting work in the MTS Network for the purpose of DTT, all workers within the MTS Network must have an RIW Card with the following competencies:

- MTS Operator job role (includes MIRS, MESA, SARC and MTS Network Induction).
- Task related competencies including site specific inductions.
- Applicable Medical Category.

The RIW Card or application with soft version of card must be always carried and presented when requested. The RIW Card contains details of the competencies that have been assessed as required to undertake the works in the identified area and task, as well as:

- An assessment of the worker's competency.
- Traceable record keeping including recording and analysis of shift and break lengths; and
- A rail safety medical conducted by an approved health provider, in alignment with National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers.

For detail training and competency requirements for Dynamic Train Testing refer to the MTR Testing & Commissioning Matrix (AIMS_CSW_RSM_MTX_000234A1)

10 Safety Management

Dynamic Train Testing (DTT) activities will be undertaken under a dual-RIM operational environment involving Metro Trains Sydney (MTS) and Sydney Metro Authority (SMA), with each accredited party responsible for managing safety in accordance with their Rail Safety National Law (RSNL 2012) obligations, ONRSR guidelines, and their respective Safety Management Systems (SMSs).

10.1 Safety Interface Agreement (SIA)

MTS and SMA have a Safety Interface Agreement in compliance with the Rail Safety National Law and the Regulations in relation to their respective Railway Operations. As per the requirements noted in the Safety Interface Agreement, MTS and SMA will continually identify and assess the Safety Interfaces, Safety Risks and any necessary Risk Controls throughout each of the difference phases and/or stages of the DTT. MTS and SMA have developed a SIA Risk Register and this is noted within Schedule B of the agreement. Hazards, Risks and Controls have been documented and agreed between both parties.

A formal Safety Interface Agreement (SIA) is in place between MTS and SMA, established in accordance with Section 99 of the Rail Safety National Law (NSW) 2012. This agreement:

- Identifies the interfaces between MTS and SMA during DTT activities and outlines the associated hazards, risks, and controls.
- Allocates responsibility for the implementation and ongoing management and review of risk controls.
- Requires both parties to maintain and update a joint Interface Risk Register (Schedule B), which documents interface risks and the controls agreed between the parties.
- Provides a governance structure for reviewing and updating interface responsibilities in response to operational changes, risk profile changes, or regulatory requirements.

In compliance with Section 100 of RSNL 2012, MTS and SMA must consult, cooperate, and coordinate their activities where duties overlap or are shared, particularly across infrastructure boundaries and during shared operational phases.

10.2 Safety Management Systems (SMSs) and Network Rules

Each accredited party (SMA & MTS) retains full accountability under RSNL 2012 for the safe management of its accredited scope, including infrastructure, systems, or rolling stock under its control. Where a safety interface exists, shared responsibilities are defined and governed by the Interface Agreement, and no party may transfer or abdicate its

legislated duties. Dynamic Train Testing will be conducted under the Safety Management Systems of each accredited party, with delineation as follows:

10.2.1 Rail Infrastructure Safety Management

SMA is the accredited RIM for all physical rail infrastructure in the Southwest corridor during DTT, including the SMA Local Possession Authority (SMLPA). SMA is accountable for:

- Track, civil, and geotechnical infrastructure
- Fenceline and corridor security
- Overhead wiring and traction power
- Assuring rail infrastructure is fit for use before DTT commences
- Applying its Rail Safety Management System and SMLPA Network Rules to infrastructure operations and site protection

For the Southwest Metro, MTS is the accredited RIM for TSOM (Technology, Signalling, Operations & Maintenance) infrastructure, including:

- Signalling systems
- Communication and control systems
- Operations control for rolling stock
- Scheduling and monitoring of train movements within the Train Testing Zone (TTZ)

Where a TTZ is established, MTS Rail Safety Rules and Procedures apply to all movements of the Metropolis Train Sets. In all other locations, SMA network rules apply unless otherwise agreed and documented.

If a TTZ is not in place Sydney Metro is the RIM for the Southwest Metro (Sydenham to Bankstown).

10.2.2 Rollingstock Safety Management

MTS is the accredited Rail Transport Operator (RTO) and Rolling Stock Operator (RSO) for the Metropolis fleet. MTS is accountable for:

- Ensuring rolling stock is safe and fit for testing
- Operating the train in accordance with its Rail Safety Management System
- Coordinating with Alstom for technical assurance and support during testing

10.2.3 Electrical Safety

SMA is the accredited RIM for the High Voltage (HV) electrical network. SMA has engaged System Connect Line Wide (SCLW) as the interim operator and maintainer of the HV network. MTS is the Designated Network Service Provider (DNSP) as defined under the Electricity Supply Act NSW. SCLW will:

- Operate under the MTS Electrical Safety Rules
- Certify that the HV network is safe and operable for each DTT activity
- Immediately report any electrical incidents to both MTS and SMA

MTS and SMA will assess and report these incidents to relevant regulators under their SMS obligations.

10.2.4 Infrastructure Booking Authority

Prior to any DTT activity, the IBA process will be used to verify and authorise infrastructure and systems for use:

- SMA will certify physical rail infrastructure, OHW, and supporting systems are safe and fit for testing.
- MTS will certify the TSOM infrastructure and rolling stock.
- Risk controls identified in the SIA Risk Register are implemented and verified through the IBA and TTZ Procedures.

Only persons and rolling stock associated with the operation of the test train movement will be permitted into the Train Testing Zone (TTZ.)

- The authority to commence the test is granted after the S2B PPO has confirmed that it is safe to proceed.
- The S2B Infrastructure Booking Authority Checklist must be completed and approved by S2B PPO and authorised MTS delegate before DTT can commence. Ref: SMCSWSSJ-JHL-WSS-PC-PRO-000001 S2B IBA Procedure.
- Similarly, the IBA form and/or appropriate hand back must be provided to SMA (or nominated representative) once the DTT has been completed.

Authorisation to commence DTT must be jointly approved by MTS and SMA then documented in accordance with the DTT Safety Assurance Strategy.

- SMA's procedures for incident notification will be used for all incidents in the SW corridor and provide the suitable notification to ONRSR, SafeWork NSW and/or any other applicable regulator.
- MTS procedures for incident notification will be used as the RIM, RSO and DNSP and will provide suitable notification to ONRSR, SafeWork NSW and/or any other applicable regulator.
- Change Management and Document Control

This Safety Management section and related arrangements are version-controlled by each party's document management system. Any changes that could affect DTT activities must be jointly reviewed and approved by MTS and SMA through their Change Control Procedures. Examples include:

- Safety responsibilities
- Network rules or procedures
- Interface arrangements
- Risk controls, or
- For changes to infrastructure or rolling stock see Configuration Change and Network Assurance

10.3 Hazard Identification

A Hazard Identification process must occur in consultation with all identified parties. All hazard controls must be implemented by the control owners prior to commencement of DTT. This is outlined in the DTT Safety Assurance Statement and DTT Hazard Log (SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-SAREP-024954) which will be reviewed as required.

10.4 Safety Assurance Statement

MTR as the Integrator has developed the overall safety argument for the start and ongoing assurance of the DTT. MTR is managing the hazard assessment as per section 10.4 above and the safety argument for the DTT is contained within the Safety Assurance Statement (SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-SAREP-024954). The Safety Assurance Statement for the DTT is progressive through the lifecycle of the DTT.

10.5 Incident & Emergency Management Plan

The primary Emergency Management Plan is the S2B Incident Emergency and Crisis Management Plan (SMCSWSW8-JHL-WBK-HS-PLN-000064) for the SWM Project and is supported by the MTR Incident Response Plan for the SW DTT

(SMCSWTS2-MTR-RFT-SM-PLN-010180) and MTS Emergency Management Plan (NWRLOTS-NRT-ADM-PM-PLN-721428).

10.6 Incident Notification (incl. Damaged assets)

Any incident including asset that is damaged during DTT will need to be reported, made safe and then repaired prior to the next test commencing. All incidents must be reported to the PPO (S2B) and for major incidents to the MTS DTT Commander.

Appendix A: Document control

Approval record

Function	Position	Name	Signature	Date
Prepared by	SMA - Rail Safety Manager	Joel Blackett		17/09/25
Reviewed by	MTS - Rail Safety and Systems Manager	Vishal Singh	 Vishal Singh (Sep 17, 2025 12:28:33 GMT+10)	17/09/25
Reviewed by	MTS - South West Delivery Director	Rachit Patel		18/09/25
Reviewed by	MTS – GM Operations & Customer Experience	Rachel Spencer	 Rachel Spencer (Sep 18, 2025 12:17:36 GMT+10)	18/09/25
Reviewed by	MTS - GM Engineering & Maintenance Delivery (EMD)	Michael Leah	 Michael Leah (Sep 18, 2025 12:20:04 GMT+10)	18/09/25
Endorsed by	Sydney Metro – Engineering Director SMC&SW	Andrew Nicol	 Andrew Nicol (Sep 18, 2025 18:03:10 GMT+10)	18/09/25
Endorsed by	Sydney Metro – Deputy Executive Director EDA	Malaeka Nadeem		18/09/25
Endorsed by	MTR - Project Director Southwest. MTR Corporation (Sydney) SMCSW PTY Limited	Wai Lau		18/09/25
Approved by	SMA – Executive Director Health and Safety	Carmel Soccorsi	 Carmel Soccorsi (Sep 18, 2025 20:08:47 GMT+10)	18/09/25
Approved by	MTS - GM Safety Quality Risk & Environment (SQRE)	Amanda Calvez		18/09/25

Amendment record

Date	Rev	Amendment description	By
17/06/2024	0.1	Initial draft	Sal Haidar
07/07/2024	0.2	Updated draft issued for comments to internal stakeholders	Sal Haider
12/08/2024	0.3	Updated draft including MTS stakeholder comments and issued to MTR for comments	Sal Haidar/Vishal Singh
05/09/24	0.4	Updated draft closing out all MTR comments	Sal Haidar/Vishal Singh
19/09/24	0.5	Updated draft closing out all SMA/S2B/MTR/MTS comments. Updated to new MTS Template Review Workshops with reps from SMA/S2B/MTR/MTS	Vishal Singh
06/11/2024	1	Ready for circulation	Vishal Singh
17/01/2025	2	Updated as per discussion with ONRSR regarding RIM requirements during DTT Phase.	Vishal Singh
24/02/2025	3	Updated as per discussion with ONRSR, MTS and SMA regarding RIM/RSO obligations for DTT	Vishal Singh
20/03/2025	4	Updated to reflect updated RIM/RSO arrangement post ONRSR discussions.	Joel Blackett
02/06/2025	5	Updated to reflect RIM arrangements post Stage 1 (limited) DT	Joel Blackett
01/08/2025	6	Updated to reflect RIM arrangements for HSDT (Stage 3 and beyond)	Vishal Singh / Joel Blackett

Appendix B: Terms and Definitions

Table 2 - Terms and Definitions

Acronym / Term	Description / Definition
MTR	Metro Transit Railway
MTS	Metro Trains Sydney
OCC	Operations Control Centre
SWM	Southwest Metro (Sydenham to Bankstown)
O & M	Operations & Maintenance
ONRSR	Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator
EPA	Environment Protection Agency (Regulator)
SafeWork NSW	Safe Work NSW Regulator
MTS Network	All railway geographical boundaries including any associated yard from the Sydney Metro Trains Facility (North), Sydney Metro Trains Facility (South), Eastern Bypass Road, Shunt necks to Sydenham Station Metro Station. This includes any reference to MTS North (SMTF-N to Chatswood Turnback) and MTS City (Chatswood Turnback to Sydenham Station including SMTF-S, Eastern Bypass Road, and Shunt necks).
RIM	Rail Infrastructure Manager
Risk Register	A document containing particulars of individual risk including at least the following key information: - • Causes and consequences • Severity of the consequences and occurrence frequency of the risk • Controls / Treatments that have been put in place and treatments that have been committed but yet to be implemented to manage the risk • Person(s) responsible for managing and overseeing the risk (Risk Owner) • Person(s) responsible for implementing individual treatment for the risk (Risk Control Owner) • Current level of risk

ROM	Railway Operations Manual
RSMP	Rail Safety Management Plan
RSIA	Rail Safety Interface Agreement
RSNL	Rail Safety National Law
RSO	Rolling Stock Operator
RTO	Rail Transport Operator
SFAIRP	So Far as is Reasonably Practical It is the duty for MTS under RSNL to eliminate risks or where risks cannot be eliminated then to minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable.
S2B	The SWM FIW Contractor as the Principal Contractor Joint venture between John Holland and Laing O'Rourke
SIA	Safety Interface Agreement
SMNW	Sydney Metro Northwest project
SMTF(N)	Sydney Metro Train Facility North
SMTF(S)	Sydney Metro Train Facility South
SMP	Safety Management Plan
SMS	Safety Management System
SSJ	Sydenham Station Junction Project
SCLW	Systems Connect Linewise
TfNSW	Transport for NSW
TMP	Train Movements Plan
Town Hall	Communication session to brief all key stakeholders of DTT activities.

TSOM	Trains, Systems, Operations & Maintenance
TSR	Temporary speed restriction
UTO	Unattended Train Operation
WHS	Work Health and Safety
WHSMP	Work Health Safety Management Plan

Appendix C: Communication

Key Person Contact Details

The table below provides contact details for key persons involved with the activities required to be performed.

Table 3 - Communications

Function	Position	Name	Contact Details
MTS	Engineering Control (EC)		Phone: (02) 9854 4666 Email: EC@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
MTS	Maintenance Centre		Phone: 02 9854 4804 Email: mc@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
MTS	Traffic Controller 1(TC1)		Phone: (02) 9854 4541 Email: traffic.controller@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
MTS	Traffic Controller 2(TC2)		Phone: (02) 9854 4542
MTS	Traffic Controller 3(TC3)		Phone: (02) 8882 3008
MTS	Traffic Controller Sydenham (TCSYD)		Phone: (02) 8882 3007
MTS	Manager Network Control (MNC) and DTT Commander		Phone: (02) 9854 4888 Email: chiefcontroller@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
MTS	Principal Engineer (Electrical)	Zahir Kureshi	Phone: 0417 946 286 Email: Zahir.Kureshi@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
MTS	Principal Engineer (Track/Civil)	Aleu Dekuek	Phone: 0484 273 902

MTS	Principal Engineer (Communications Systems)	Amir Deilami	Email: Aleu.Dekuek@metrotrains-sydney.com.au Phone: 0419 228 837 Email: Amir.Deilami@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Principal Engineer (Signalling)	Jeff Chung	Phone: 0447 894 670 Email: jeff.chung@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Principal Engineer (Rolling stock)	Oliver Moodie	Phone: 0437 605 800 Email: oliver.moodie@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Safety Assurance & Risk Manager	Monisha Samuel	Phone: 0474 373 649 Email: Monisha.samuel@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Rail Safety & Systems Manager	Vishal Singh	Phone: 0409 840 816 Email: vishal.singh@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Head of SQRE	Melissa Northey	Phone: 0456 629 490 Email: melissa.northey@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Southwest Project Delivery Director	Rachit Patel	Phone: 0412 867 665 Email: rachit.patel@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
	Possession Planning Manager	Danny Berghofer	Phone: 0437 841 315 Email: danny.berghofer@metrotrains-sydney.com.au

MTS	Electrical Network Manager	Jeff Gordon	Phone: 0437574675 Email: jeff.gordon@metrotrains-sydney.com.au
ALSTOM	Depot Traffic Controller (DTC)		Phone: 9854 4819 Email: dtc.alstom@alstomgroup.com
ALSTOM	Testing / Commissioning Manager	NADA Mohamed	Phone: 0414 541 979 Email: mohamed.nada@alstomgroup.com
MTR	Senior Area Manager	Juan Gutierrez	Phone: 0466897404 Email: JUAN.GUTIERREZ@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Section Lead	Albert Lo	Phone: 0400775950 Email: ALBERT.LO@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Project Engineer	Marco Chen	Phone: 0477976353 Email: MARCO.CHEN@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Head of HSEQ & Sustainability	Alex Chang	Phone: 0423825028 Email: ALEX.CHANG@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Rail Operations Manager	Emmanuel Manolis	Phone: 0413846970 Email: EMMANUAL.MANOLIS@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Testing / Commissioning Manager	Andrew Turner	Phone: 0413 139 672 Email: ANDREW.TURNER@mtraustralia.com.au

MTR	Principal Systems Integration Manager	Phil Hawkins	Phone: 0459 453 049 Email: phil.hawkins@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Snr. CCS Engineer	Penny Lam	Phone: 0411494260 Email: PENNY.LAM@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Snr. Communications Engineer	Mohammad Mazumder	Phone: 0469822486 Email: MOHAMMAD.MAZUMDER@mtraustralia.com.au
MTR	Trains Manager	Kenneth Ooi	Phone: 0407508785 Email: KENNETH.OOI@mtraustralia.com.au
S2B	Possession Protection Officer		Phone: 0458 901 670 Email: Possessionlogistics@jhlorjv.com.au
SCLW	Southwest Electrical Controller		Phone: 0472 683 650 Email: elec.isolations@sclww.com.au
SMA	Director Testing and Commissioning	Kate Ford	Email: kate.ford@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: +61474893319
SMA	Rail Safety Manager	Joel Blackett	Email: joel.blackett@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: 0423 254 593
SMA	Associate Director Engineering (Rolling stock)	Steven Mok	Email: steven.mok@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: 0400046940

SMA	Associate Director Engineering (Track)	Phil Blundy	Email: phil.blundy2@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: +61498539435
SMA	Director Health and Safety Project Delivery	Zoran Sukara	Email: Zoran.sukara@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: 0435 658 535
SMA	TSOM IG	Kyle Lazaro	Email: jeffrey.lazaro@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: 0428 057 738
SMA	Construction Director Linewide	Jose Argueta	Email: jose.arguetadominguez2@transport.nsw.gov.au Phone: 0457 561 266

Radio Communication Details

Communication during train movements will utilise the O&M Contractor Radio System where the radio communications is recorded. Communication channels are to be identified and agreed and detailed below.

Communication on the SWM section during the DTT initially will be utilising the Tetra Radio which must be available at the start of DTT.

Table 4 - Radio Channels

Area	Radio Channels
MTS RIM Area (SMNW and City Metro)	NRT Staff Stations NTR
SMA RIM Area (Southwest Metro)	Rail Operations
Metropolis Train (MTS CJC-T) (SMNW only)	Same as MTS RIM Area (SMNW and City)
Metropolis Train (ALSTOM / MTR)	Testing & Commissioning (T&C)

Appendix D: Related documents

Note: some documents will be closely interconnected and will need to be reviewed when this one is changed. Others are simply related content that supplement the material in this document.

Table 5 - Related Documents

Document #	Document title
MTS-PCSW-PL-96114	Operational Interface Protocol (OIP) for City Metro - MTS - MTR - System Connect
SMCSWTS2-MTR-CSW-TD-PLN-010158	MTR/MTS Trains T&C Handover Protocol
SMCSWLWC-SYC-CSW-ED-PLN-023348	Sydney Metro City & Southwest Electrical Interface Plan
SMCSW-HS-PR-60060	Rail Safeworking Procedure - Transfer of Test Trains (Sydenham SMTF-S to SW Corridor – Marrickville)
SMCSWLWC-SYC-CSW-IFSCH-010761	HV Commissioning – Pre-Energisation and Post Energisation Requirements
NWRLOTS-NRT-SWD-HV-SPC-720350	MTS Electrical Authorisations – Electrical Authorisations for Instructed and Authorised Persons
SMCSW-RS-PR-60022	Train Testing Zone (TTZ) Procedure
SMCSWSSJ-JHL-WSS-PC-PRO-000001	Infrastructure Booking Authority Southwest – Procedure for the S2B Possession Protection Officer (s2b & SMA)
MTS-AGN-PL-70114 & NWRLOTS-NRT-PRD-PM-PLN-720541	MTS Configuration Management Plan (CMP) – Sydney Metro Northwest and City & Southwest
SMCSWSW8-JHL-WBK-HS-PLN-000004	Sydenham to Bankstown - SWM3 Security Management Plan

SMCSWTS2-MTR- CSW-PM-PLN- 082642	Testing and Commissioning Plan for Dynamic Train Running for Southwest
SMCSWTS2-MTR- CSW-SA-REP- 082690	Safety Assurance Statement for the Dynamic Train Testing (DTT)
SMCSWTS2-MTR- RFT-SM-PLN- 010180	MTR Incident Response Plan (Train Movements SMTF-N, SMNW Mainline, SMTF-S and CSW Mainline)
SMCSWSW8-JHL- WBK-HS-PLN- 000006	Incident Emergency and Crisis Management Plan (S2B)
SMCSWSSJ-JHL- WSS-PC-PLN- 000125	S2B Possession Management Plan (S2B-JHORJV)
MTSMS-NCP-DIA- 000003	Metro Train Sydney - Network Schematic Diagram Diagram Name: BNK-CHW SYDNEY METRO CITY & SOUTHWEST SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
NWRLOTS-NRT- SWD-RS-REG- 720800	Safety Interface Agreement Between Sydney Metro and Metro Trains Sydney
NWRLOTS-NRT- ADM-PM-PLN- 721428	MTS Emergency Management Plan

Appendix F: Roles & Responsibilities / RACI

Table 6 - Responsibilities

R	Responsible	The people or persons expected to engage in an activity	Sydney Metro (SWM RIM)	MTS (RIM & RSO)	MTS (M1 RIM)	S2B (PC) [SMA RIM]	MTR (PCBU)	Alstom	SCLW
	A	Accountable							
	C	Consulted							
	I	Informed							
Activity									
Effectively control and manage the operation and maintenance of rail infrastructure and passenger rolling stock on M1 Metro network			I	R,A	R,A	I	I	R, I	-
Effectively control and manage rail infrastructure on SWM between Sydenham and Bankstown.			R,A	C,I	I	R	C,I	I	I
Effectively control and manage rolling stock related to DTT between Sydenham and Bankstown.			C,I	R,A	C,I	I	R	C,I	I
Effectively control and manage all testing, commissioning and other work activities including the security of the rail corridor and entry of all workers and equipment within the SWM. Responsible for the Possession Management and implementation of the SMLPA and TTZ Responsible for the management of Protection Officers in the SWM section and the boundaries for which they work. Responsible for the communication protocols between the PPO and POs that will be engaged throughout the SWM network as part of the Sydney Metro Local Possession Area (SMLPA). Management of the four week lookahead to the various construction works that need to be managed in the SWM Section.			R,A	C,I	C,I	R	C,I	I	-

R A C I	Responsible	The people or persons expected to engage in an activity	Sydney Metro (SWM RIM)	MTS (RIM & RSO)	MTS (M1 RIM)	S2B (PC) [SMA RIM]	MTR (PCBU)	Alstom	SCLW
	Accountable	Person accountable for the results and authorised to make decisions							
	Consulted	Person's with expertise relevant to activity involved prior to decisions							
	Informed	People that need to be kept informed of decisions or actions.							
		Review and approve the Infrastructure Booking Authority Form for the purpose of commencing DTT. Confirms with S2B PPO the completion of DTT and such hand back TTZ for DTT back to S2B (SMA)	R,A	R	I	C,I	R	I	C,I
		Effective management of route knowledge training for train operators	C,I	R,A	I	C,I	R	C,I	-
		Effective management of relevant RSW competencies including inductions and training.	R,A	R,A	I	R	R	R	R
		Responsible for other applicable regulatory reporting (eg. Safework, IPART)	R,A	R,A	R,A	R,A	C,I	C,I	R,A
		Responsible for reporting ONRSR notifiable occurrences	R,A	R,A	R,A	-	-	-	-
		Responsible for management of incidents and emergencies on SWM Network outside of DTT	R,A	R	C,I	R	R	C,I	R
		Responsible for management of incidents and emergencies during DTT	R	R,A	R,A	R	R	C,I	R
		Responsible for management of incidents and emergencies on M1 Network outside of DTT	C,I	R	R,A	I	C,I	C,I	I
		Control and maintenance of the Electrical Network on SWM Interim operator of SWM HV & 1500v electrical network. Will supply the electrical workers to manage this network (Under MTS Electrical Safety Rule).	R,A	C,I	C,I	C,I	I	I	R

R A C I	Responsible	The people or persons expected to engage in an activity	Sydney Metro (SWM RIM)	MTS (RIM & RSO)	MTS (M1 RIM)	S2B (PC) [SMA RIM]	MTR (PCBU)	Alstom	SCLW
	Accountable	Person accountable for the results and authorised to make decisions							
	Consulted	Person's with expertise relevant to activity involved prior to decisions							
	Informed	People that need to be kept informed of decisions or actions.							
Assurance and Governance			R,A	R,A	R,A	C,I	C,I	C,I	C,I
Removal and replacement of the protection configuration at the RIM boundary at Sydenham (stop blocks, fence, etc.)			R,A	C,I	R,A	R	R	C,I	I
Safe scheduling, control and monitoring of Metropolis Trains for DTT purposes: - Authorisation of train movements: [Role - Train Coordinator (MTR).] - Route setting and control of the movement of trains as instructed by Train Coordinator [Role – Traffic Controller (MTS).]			R	R,A	C,I	C,I	R	C,I	-
Supplying suitably qualified CJC-T (Drivers for the Metropolis Train) and TC's (Traffic Controllers) and Train Pilots for the DTT phase			I	R,A	I	I	R	C,I	-
Requirement to ensure integrity of Rollingstock, baseline configuration during Train construction, testing and commissioning. Supply of the rolling stock Safety Certification			I	R,A	I	I	I	R	-

